FPCI’s Middle Power Insights – Kazakhstan's Multi-Vector Diplomacy: Bridging Rival Powers through Networked Multilateralism

The transition from a US-led unipolarity to a more complex multipolar order has elevated the role of middle powers. Countries like India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa and Kazakhstan are exerting “considerable countervailing force” to prevent any single great power from dominating. These states pursue strategic autonomy – independent foreign policies guided by national interest rather than bloc allegiance. They refuse to be treated as “pawn[s] in a new cold war,” as former Indonesian President Joko Widodo put it. Instead, middle powers hedge between major powers: maintaining ties with both the US and China while aligning with neither. Notably, their closer engagement with China is often a response to U.S. actions – as Washington’s use of sanctions and tariffs has impelled them to hedge bets and diversify partners. Kazakhstan exemplifies this autonomy through its “multi-vector” diplomacy, balancing relations with Russia, China, the U.S., and others. Astana has elevated pragmatic neutrality to an art form, seeking regional stability and development without taking sides in great-power rivalries. This approach has helped Kazakhstan remain resilient and courted by all major players even amid global turbulence.

A return of President Trump to Washington has jolted middle powers into recalibrating their economic strategies. In early 2025, the U.S. began implementing sweeping “reciprocal” tariffs, raising import duties to mirror other countries’ tariffs, a move expected to “create chaos” for global businesses and allies alike. Middle powers have already faced these challenges during first Trump administration and responded by doubling down on economic diversification and regional trade pacts. Many “connector economies”, countries positioned to trade with both the U.S. and China, have benefited from supply chain shifts as global firms seek to bypass tariffs. For example, Vietnam, Mexico and Indonesia expanded exports to the U.S. while importing more from China, effectively acting as assembly hubs that circumvent direct U.S.-China trade frictions. As a result of U.S. tariffs, China’s share of U.S. imports fell from 22% in 2018 to 11.5% in 2024, replaced by other countries’ goods. China, in turn, has reoriented trade toward the Global South – it now trades more with developing countries than with developed ones, and ASEAN overtook the EU and U.S. as China’s largest trade partner. Middle powers are thus capitalizing on geo-economic shifts while advocating for a stable, rules-based trade system. Kazakhstan, relatively less exposed to U.S. tariffs, can seize opportunities in this environment. It had already increased its exports of oil, metals and grain to alternate markets and welcomed investment redirected from tariff-hit supply chains. At the same time, Kazakhstan has voiced support for WTO principles and engaged in negotiations to preserve a rules-based multilateral trading system, wary that a tariff free-for-all would hurt smaller economies.

The late 2020s have brought both hopes and strains for the rules-based multilateral economic system. On one hand, major developing economies have gained greater weight – for example, the expanded BRICS bloc now constitutes over a quarter of global GDP and nearly half the world’s population – and are pushing for a more inclusive order. On the other hand, fragmentation is growing. The World Trade Organization (WTO) remains in crisis: efforts to restore its dispute settlement mechanism by end-2024 failed to meet the deadline, largely due to U.S. resistance to reviving the Appellate Body. Despite “significant progress” in technical talks, WTO members could not agree on final reforms, and the new Trump administration in Washington is unlikely to relent on its objections. This paralysis undermines the credibility of the WTO and the rules-based trading system, at a time when global trade rules are needed to manage U.S.-China decoupling, industrial subsidies, and digital trade.

Many middle powers have responded by turning to minilateral trade agreements and South-South commerce. Frameworks like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in Asia and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are being advanced to liberalize trade regionally. Meanwhile, developing countries are trading more among themselves (South-South trade) to reduce reliance on Western markets. For instance, China’s trade with the Global South now exceeds its trade with developed economies, and Gulf Arab states increasingly trade oil in non-dollar currencies with Asian partners. There are also concerted moves to reform global financial governance – e.g. the G20 in 2023 agreed to admit the African Union as a permanent member, and discussions continue on expanding developing countries’ voice in the IMF/World Bank. The “rules-based order” is thus at a crossroads: will it be renovated to reflect new power realities, or bypassed by parallel systems? Middle powers are at the forefront of this question. Kazakhstan, for its part, advocates for inclusive multilateralism – it participated actively in the WTO’s 13th Ministerial Conference (February 2024) where members pledged not to backslide on protectionism and to work toward a “fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system”. At the same time, Kazakhstan is investing in regional economic integration (within Central Asia and Eurasia) as a buffer against global trade uncertainties. For example, it champions the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route as an alternative trade corridor, reflecting a pragmatic adaptation to shifts in the economic order.

The intensifying U.S.-China strategic rivalry has forced middle powers to perform a careful balancing act. Most have sought a middle path that secures economic benefits from China’s rise while mitigating security risks and preserving ties with the West. A striking pattern is that no major middle power has chosen outright containment of China – instead, strategies range from engagement with hedging to selective partnership. For many, China is a vital economic partner: it is the top trading nation for over 120 countries, a key investor in infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and an emerging source of technology and finance for the Global South. Middle powers like Brazil and South Africa warmly welcome Chinese investment (e.g. in mining, telecoms) but also guard their sovereignty, ensuring they’re not overly dependent. India provides an example: it has significant tensions with China (border clashes, competition for influence), yet India remains a member of China-led groups like BRICS and the SCO and has increased its trade with China in absolute terms.

What unites these strategies is strategic autonomy – choosing issue-by-issue alignment. Notably, many middle powers attribute their growing ties with Beijing partly to U.S. policies: America’s aggressive use of sanctions and export controls has sometimes pushed countries like Turkey or Indonesia to deepen non-Western partnerships as a hedge. In Europe, even U.S. allies are embracing a version of this autonomy: France’s President Macron has urged Europe to become a “third pole” vis-à-vis U.S. and China, pursuing détente and trade with China while the U.S. focuses on “de-risking”. In 2024, the EU’s stance toward China was termed “de-risk, not decouple”, reflecting European middle powers’ desire to maintain engagement on their own terms. Kazakhstan also illustrates a balanced China policy: it is a staunch participant in BRI (seeing it as an opportunity for infrastructure and investment) and has welcomed Chinese firms into energy, mining, and transport sectors. China is now one of Kazakhstan’s top trading partners and a crucial market for its oil. Yet Kazakhstan also proactively cultivates relations with the West, Japan, South Korea and others, ensuring it is not in China’s pocket. It has, for instance, partnered with the U.S. and EU on renewable energy projects and with Japan on rare earth mineral development, as part of its diversification. Moreover, Kazakhstan has shown it will stand up for its interests; it negotiated hard with China on equitable transit fees and has kept Chinese influence in check by limiting external ownership of land. This nuanced approach mirrors that of many middle powers: embrace China’s economic opportunity, but retain the freedom to say no – an equilibrium they see as essential amid the U.S.-China rivalry.

Redefining Strategic Autonomy and Minilateralism

Over the past two years, the concept of strategic autonomy has been redefined across different regions as states adjust to the new geopolitical landscape. For the European Union, Russia’s war in Ukraine ironically led to both greater dependence on the U.S. for security and a renewed drive to build autonomous capacity (especially in defense and energy). Meanwhile, in Asia, countries like India loudly assert their entitlement to “have its own side” – as External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said, India’s choices are guided by its unique interests, not by Cold War-era alignments. +We see middle powers constantly recalibrating their autonomy: Turkey, for example, swung from a confrontational stance with Western partners to a more conciliatory approach in 2024 (seeking to repair EU ties) even as it retains independent dealings with Russia and a refusal to sanction Moscow. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have similarly diversified – embracing partnerships with China (even joining BRICS) and mediating in regional conflicts, yet still valuing their U.S. security ties.

Confidence in multilateral institutions has eroded, given the repeated deadlocks in the UN Security Council (vetoes blocking action on Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, Syria, etc.) and the slow pace of reform. This has given rise to minilateralism – the pursuit of cooperation through small, flexible coalitions of like-minded states. Examples include security-focused groups often led by great powers (like AUKUS or the Quad in the Indo-Pacific), but also many led by or involving middle powers: the Alliance for Multilateralism (launched by France and Germany with others), MIKTA (a forum of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia), and issue-specific coalitions (such as the climate-oriented High Ambition Coalition which includes developing mid-sized states). Middle powers increasingly use these platforms to make progress where global consensus is elusive. For instance, when WTO talks stall, a subset of countries negotiates interim agreements (e.g. the plurilateral agreement on digital trade or the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration arrangement to substitute for the WTO appellate body). In global diplomacy, forums like the G20 have effectively become surrogate decision-making bodies on economic issues, partly because they are more representative than the G7 but more agile than the UNGA.

The G20’s 2024 New Delhi summit, under India’s presidency, managed a joint declaration bridging differences on Ukraine – a diplomatic feat credited to Indian, Indonesian, Brazilian and other middle-power negotiators. Likewise, calls for UN reform have intensified: India, Brazil, South Africa, among others, demand permanent UNSC seats, and nearly all countries agree the Security Council must expand to reflect 21st-century realities. Kazakhstan aligns with this push for reform and minilateral innovation. It has been a proponent of “networked multilateralism,” where regional organizations and small groupings support and supplement the UN. Notably, Kazakhstan helped found the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and in 2022-2023 led efforts to transform CICA into a full-fledged international organization to bolster Asian security cooperation. Astana also launched the Astana International Forum (AIF) in 2023 as a platform to bring together diverse voices (from middle powers, global south, and great powers alike) to “foster dialogue” on global challenges. These initiatives show how a country like Kazakhstan seeks to both reform existing institutions and create new venues in response to the trust deficit in traditional multilateralism.

There is a palpable sense among middle powers of the Global South that now is their moment to redefine South–South cooperation for the 21st century. The old narrative of a monolithic “Third World” has given way to a more nuanced vision of “multiple Souths” working in tandem on shared goals. In practical terms, this means stronger links between regions of the Global South: Latin America with Africa, Asia with the Middle East, etc., not just bilateral ties with former colonial powers. For example, we see growing Arab–Africa cooperation (the UAE and Qatar investing heavily in African infrastructure and clean energy, Egypt forging trade ties with East Africa through the AfCFTA), and Latin America-Asia links (Brazil and Indonesia co-founded an OPEC-like forum for rubber producers; Mercosur is courting ASEAN for a trade agreement). These cross-regional initiatives are laying the groundwork for a truly interconnected Global South. Another element of the future vision is knowledge exchange and capacity building: countries are learning from each other’s development models more directly. Rwanda studies Singapore’s experience in becoming a services hub; India’s digital payment innovations inspire projects in Brazil; Vietnam’s industrial policy is of keen interest to African manufacturing aspirants. Such exchanges are less about ideology and more about pragmatism – what works in one middle-income country might be adapted in another.

There’s also a push to synergize regional development agendas. The African Union’s Agenda 2063, ASEAN’s Community Vision 2025, Latin America’s CELAC Plan, and Central Asia’s connectivity plans all have overlapping themes of integration, sustainability, and sovereignty. Middle powers are increasingly acting to harmonize these visions. A concrete step in 2024 was the agreement between the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat and Mercosur to share best practices and potentially link their markets in the future – championed by South Africa and Brazil. Similarly, Central Asian states under Kazakhstan’s guidance are aligning their infrastructure plans with China’s Belt and Road and the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, trying to maximize complementarity rather than competition among big projects. We also see the emergence of South–South development financing. China’s role is well known, but others are stepping up: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey have created their own foreign aid and investment funds targeting fellow developing countries; India established a $500 million South Asia infrastructure fund; and African nations are considering an African Stability Mechanism (akin to a regional IMF) to help each other in financial crises. The expanded BRICS’s New Development Bank and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are poised to collaborate more with regional banks (like the African Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank) to finance South–South priorities. The aim is a future where developing nations are not solely reliant on Western-led institutions for capital and know-how.

The implications of these minilateral groupings for the global order are significant. They allow middle powers to pilot new forms of governance – whether it’s a BRICS development financing mechanism or a MIKTA proposal on UN peacekeeping improvements – and then introduce them to universal institutions. They also serve as pressure valves: countries frustrated with Western dominance can find solidarity and practical partnerships in alternative clubs, reducing global polarization by giving all players a stake.