Observer Research Foundation – Kazakhstan in Harsh V. Pant and Kaush Arha, (eds.), A Global Vision of Free and Open Spaces: Creating Connectivity in the Modern World

Central Asia is uniquely positioned to gain substantial benefits from free and open initiatives, perhaps more so than any other part of the world.[i] Historically, the region has had little freedom and openness, if at all, largely due to its Soviet legacy. This past has posed a burden during the transition period following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leading to the early establishment of authoritarian regimes across the newly independent states.[ii]

Furthermore, the region’s geopolitical environment exacerbates challenges owing to its powerful autocratic neighbours. The two largest, China and Russia, are not only authoritarian regimes but also great powers with ambitions to challenge the liberal world order.[iii] Another neighbouring state, Iran, has had a fraught relationship with the global community, being the most sanctioned country worldwide until the onset of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, Afghanistan has remained one of the most troubled nations globally since the Western intervention in 2001, a situation that has persisted following the withdrawal of Western troops and the Taliban’s resurgence as the dominant political force. The adjoining Caucasus region, having experienced similar post-Soviet transformations, faces instability due to border disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia and Russia.

A Distant Region

Central Asia has long been described as the “least integrated region” globally, a designation underscored by the fact that none of the multilateral organisations in the region include all five Central Asian countries. A key factor contributing to this fragmentation is Turkmenistan's self-declared status as a permanently neutral country, a position formally recognised by the United Nations General Assembly. This neutrality precludes Turkmenistan from participating in any form of political or military bloc, thus preventing full regional integration.

Among the existing multilateral frameworks, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the only one that includes the remaining four Central Asian states. However, other regional organisations reflect further disunity: Uzbekistan is not a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan remain outside the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Moreover, none of these organisations have their origins within the region itself. They are externally driven and only partially overlap with Central Asia in their scope and objectives.

The lack of internal multilateralism is largely due to the region's complex geopolitics and lack of a shared goal for intra-regional cooperation. The economic, political, and social challenges facing Central Asia are such that external involvement is necessary for effective management, but this often brings with it conflicting external interests. These external powers—whether Russia, China, or other global players, tend to have divergent views and strategic objectives for Central Asia, which would likely clash within any single multilateral institution.

As a result, regional integration in Central Asia is in a conundrum. Favouring one great power within a single regional organisation risks alienating the others and undermining the region's tactical policy of multi-alignment. On the other hand, including multiple great powers within the same organisation often leads to a stalemate, as their differing interests and visions for the region conflict. This dilemma is exemplified by the challenges of aligning the Russian-led EAEU and the China-led SCO.[iv] Despite the growing rapprochement between Russia and China, even partial integration or the removal of duplicating agendas between these two organisations remains problematic. Furthermore, any potential alignment between these great powers within the context of regional integration is likely to come at the expense of Central Asian interests, thereby compromising the region's ability to remain 'free' in its decision-making.

Despite these obstacles to multilateral integration, Central Asia stands out as one of the few regions in the world where the countries routinely present themselves not as individual states with separate agendas, but as a unified region. This is achieved through the innovative use of the C5+1 format, which the region has established with a number of powers, including the United States (US), China, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union (EU). The C5+1 format allows Central Asia to engage with different external partners on a bilateral basis while simultaneously coming together as a region to address common concerns. This format effectively enables the Central Asian states to maintain their ‘free’ status, engaging externally without becoming beholden to the interests of any single great power.

Thus, the concept of ‘free and open’ in Central Asia has always been fraught with complexity, involving not only the internal struggle for liberalisation and democratisation but also the need to withstand external pressures and the diffusion of authoritarian values. Confronted with these multifaceted challenges, the countries of the region are compelled to seek partnerships beyond their immediate neighbourhood, looking farther afield for cooperation opportunities. This has also fostered a sense of regional solidarity, as the states of Central Asia recognise their common interests and challenges, driving them to collaborate more closely with one another.

This regional collaboration is indispensable for Central Asia, particularly considering the region's unique challenges. It holds the distinction of being the only landlocked region in the world with no straightforward access to global maritime routes. The most feasible route to the sea involves crossing the landlocked Caspian Sea, then moving through the Caucasus to the Black Sea, into the Mediterranean, and eventually reaching the Atlantic Ocean through the Strait of Gibraltar or the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal and Red Sea. The mere description of this route underscores its complexity, characterised by numerous bottlenecks that render maritime trade largely impractical for the region. As a result, Central Asia's landlocked status severely limits its ability to engage directly in global maritime commerce.

Yet, the region’s geographical constraints can also be viewed as a strategic advantage. Its centrality has historically made it a crucial transit point between East and West, a role it has played since the ancient Silk Road era. In the contemporary context, it serves as a vital corridor connecting China, the world's manufacturing powerhouse, with its largest market, the EU. While Central Asia derives considerable economic benefits from its role in facilitating east-west land transit, these gains do not fully ameliorate its landlocked condition. Rather, they provide a limited window to the broader world, with the primary beneficiaries of these routes being the neighbouring great powers—China, which supplies the goods, and Russia, which serves as the principal transit state along the route. Central Asia itself, despite being an integral part of these transit routes, often finds itself as a mere intermediary rather than a principal player.

This is not surprising, given the inherent differences between land and maritime trade routes. Unlike sailing oceans, land routes require the development and maintenance of extensive infrastructure. Without infrastructure, there is no viable route. Establishing such infrastructure, especially on the scale necessary to traverse the vast and challenging terrain of Central Asia, constitutes a monumental undertaking. The region's remote geography demands advanced technology and substantial financial investment, not only for construction but also for ongoing maintenance.

As developing countries, the Central Asian states have historically lacked the necessary financial resources to build and maintain this infrastructure independently. Consequently, they have been compelled to rely on investments from larger powers to fund these grand infrastructure projects. Moreover, even when alternative routes are constructed, their viability and profitability depend on their capacity utilisation. If these routes are not used to their full potential, they become unprofitable and burdensome to maintain, adding another layer of complexity to the region's efforts to overcome its landlocked status.

The fate of the Middle Corridor serves as a stark illustration of the challenges Central Asia faces in its pursuit of becoming truly free and open.[v] Despite the existing infrastructure and the fact that the route is geographically shorter than the Northern Corridor through Russia (7,000 km vs. 10,000 km), the Middle Corridor has historically lagged in terms of competitiveness.12 The Trans-Siberian Railway, which forms the backbone of the Northern Corridor, benefits from superior infrastructure and a direct, relatively unobstructed route. This results in shorter transit times despite the longer distance. Moreover, the Northern Corridor's rail infrastructure is unimodal, meaning that goods travel by rail from start to finish, whereas the Middle Corridor is multimodal, requiring the use of rail, ferries, and cargo ships to cross the Caspian and Black Seas before reaching Europe. This multimodality introduces additional complexities, delays, and costs.

Another drawback of the Middle Corridor is the number of border crossings it entails. Unlike the Northern Corridor, which passes through only one country—Russia—the Middle Corridor involves multiple countries, each with its own customs procedures and bureaucratic hurdles. This multiplicity of borders further complicates and lengthens the transit process, making the route less attractive to shippers.

As a result, reaching Europe via the Northern Corridor has been up to three times faster than using the Middle Corridor. Even though the Northern route is geographically longer, its better rail infrastructure, fewer customs checks, and lack of the need to transfer cargo across bodies of water made it the preferred choice for trade between China and Europe. From Beijing's perspective, the Middle Corridor was viewed as a complementary route at best, not a primary one. Meanwhile, the countries that stood to benefit the most from the Middle Corridor—Türkiye, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia—lacked the financial resources to invest in the necessary infrastructure to make the route competitive.

Among the three external powers with the potential to support the opening of Central Asia-Russia, China, and the EU-Russia had the least incentive to do so. For Moscow, the opening of alternative trade routes that bypassed its territory posed a direct threat to its economic interests, as it could lose out on transit revenues. More critically, such alternatives could undermine Russia's strategic influence in a region it has long considered its geopolitical backyard. While Russia might tolerate the transit of Chinese goods through the Middle Corridor, it had little interest in promoting any routes that would allow Central Asian countries to access world markets independently of Russian control. For Russia, a closed Central Asia was more in line with its strategic interests.

The EU, while theoretically capable of fostering the development of the Middle Corridor, demonstrated limited interest in doing so. The Northern Corridor sufficed for European needs, even after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent imposition of sanctions. This lack of enthusiasm for alternative routes reflects the EU's generally reactive and conservative approach to Central Asia over the past decade—a short-sighted stance, perhaps, but one consistent with its broader policy towards the region.

China, of the three, appeared the most promising partner for developing alternative routes and opening Central Asia. It was in Astana, Kazakhstan, in 2013 that Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a grand strategy aimed at enhancing connectivity and trade across Eurasia. However, even after 2014, when China discarded its original plans for a Greater Eurasian Route that included Ukraine as a hub, it remained ambivalent about the Middle Corridor. China's focus remained on expanding and improving existing infrastructure rather than committing fully to the development of this alternative route.

Thus, as Central Asia entered the fourth decade since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the region remained largely constrained, with its major external partners pursuing their own agendas: Russia working to keep the region closed, China keeping it open only for transit purposes, and the EU showing a rhetorical commitment to a free and open Central Asia but being largely content with the status quo.

The turning point that made a genuinely free and open Central Asia possible was the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2024 and the ensuing geopolitical shifts.[vi] The war led to a strategic retreat of Russian influence in the region and created a pressing need for the EU to find alternative trade routes that bypassed Russia. China, faced with these new dynamics, was compelled to reconsider the Middle Corridor as a viable option to meet European demand.[vii] More importantly, the countries of Central Asia, along with their neighbours in the Caspian-Black Sea region, reached a point of no return in their realisation of the necessity to chart their own course, take control of their destiny, and move forward in collaboration with other nations that share similar goals.

A ‘Free’ Central Asia

The need for careful diplomacy is especially pronounced in regions like Central Asia, where geopolitical stakes are high and the margin for error is slim. The challenges facing regional powers here are exacerbated by their geographic and economic vulnerabilities. Unlike great powers, whose geopolitical strategies often pursue status and influence, smaller powers like those in Central Asia are driven by the necessity for stability and survival. Without the economic resilience to weather crises and maintain influence, these countries must be more cautious and selective in their partnerships. They cannot afford bold, unilateral moves; instead, they must navigate international landscapes with care, addressing pressing issues one at a time.

Among the factors that have contributed to the region becoming more 'free' despite the proximity of two assertive Eurasian powers—Russia and China—two stand out: the effectiveness of the C5+1 format and the evolving identity of Kazakhstan as a middle power.[viii]

Kazakhstan has historically been pragmatic in its foreign policy, aiming to be a partner to all and an opponent to none. This approach aligns with the typical behaviour of a normative middle power, even though Kazakhstan was not widely recognised as such until recently. However, recent years have seen a significant shift in Kazakhstan’s stance toward a more assertive and reformist position. Two key drivers of this shift are Kazakhstan’s growing frustration with the ineffectiveness of global governance structures, particularly the Bretton Woods institutions, and the apparent inability of great powers to find common ground on shared global concerns such as climate change, trade regulations, and security issues. The escalating competition between great powers exacerbates these frustrations, as each side becomes increasingly self-serving, prioritising its own interests while neglecting broader global challenges.[ix]

This shift underscores a broader trend away from normative behaviour and toward minilateralism—pragmatic, regional, and realism-based initiatives focused on solving problems rather than merely discussing them.18 Kazakhstan’s pragmatic policy approach turns challenges into opportunities for cooperation, making it a valuable contributor to regional power cooperation. While the nation is a major exporter of oil and gas, its potential as a partner extends far beyond. As the world's largest producer of uranium and a country with enormous deposits of rare-earth elements essential for clean-energy technologies, Kazakhstan is well-positioned to play a critical role in the global energy transition.

Kazakhstan’s potential as a partner is particularly attractive to countries seeking to reduce their dependence on Russia or China for critical materials. While these goals may not be of primary importance to the great powers, Kazakhstan increasingly seeks successful cooperation with other middle powers, such as Türkiye, India, Singapore, and Japan. As Central Asia gains power and recognition on the global stage, Kazakhstan is emerging as a pivotal state with ambitions to lead regional cooperation and enhance connectivity to both world markets and global governance systems.[x]

This vision highlights Kazakhstan’s growing focus on middle power diplomacy, which is likely to intensify. Historically, Kazakhstan has leveraged competing interests and high-profile events to enhance its influence and promote its strategic interests. Its newfound assertiveness as a middle power is likely to resonate across Central Asia and the Caucasus, regions increasingly affected by the intensifying rivalry between great powers. By positioning itself as a mediator and facilitator, Kazakhstan aims to foster stability and cooperation, further solidifying its role as a key player in regional and global affairs.

In essence, Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy—seeking to balance relationships with various global powers without aligning too closely with any single bloc or alliance—has positioned it as a 'living wall' for the region. By absorbing much of the pressure from Russia, China, and occasionally the West, Kazakhstan has acted as a buffer, shielding other countries in the region and allowing them to focus on their internal affairs. The benefit of this approach is clear: Kazakhstan has attracted the majority of foreign direct investment (FDI) and credits in the region, which it has adroitly channelled into enhancing connectivity across Central Asia. This strategic positioning not only strengthens Kazakhstan’s security and stability but also contributes to the broader goal of opening and integrating the entire region into the global economy.

Kazakhstan's approach to regional dynamics is notably pragmatic and region-focused, rather than driven by ambitions to assert itself as a regional hegemon. As the largest and most economically and politically powerful state in Central Asia, Kazakhstan undoubtedly plays a pivotal role in the region. Its strategic position and economic strength make it the principal beneficiary of the Middle Corridor's development. However, its vision for the region transcends narrow national interests, reflecting a broader commitment to fostering regional stability and prosperity.

Kazakhstan's rise to middle power status has been marked by a more assertive and reformist approach toward the liberal world order. This shift does not, however, come at the expense of its neighbours. Instead, the country’s approach has been characterised by an emphasis on inclusivity and regional cooperation. The COVID-19 pandemic served as a critical turning point, underscoring the interconnectedness of global challenges and the importance of a diversified network of partnerships. For Kazakhstan, the pandemic was a wake-up call that highlighted the limitations of unilateralism and the necessity of cultivating an array of international relationships to ensure resilience in the face of global crises.

This commitment to regional collaboration is evident in Kazakhstan's support for the C5+1 format, which provides a platform for Central Asian states to engage collectively with major international partners. While Kazakhstan's influence is significant, the C5+1 format is designed to represent the region as a whole, preserving the flexibility inherent in bilateral relations while promoting a unified regional voice. This structure enables Central Asian states to negotiate and collaborate with external powers as a bloc, enhancing their collective bargaining power while maintaining the autonomy of individual states.

The C5+1 format is a unique and flexible diplomatic framework for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to engage with major global powers as a unified region. This format was first introduced by Japan in August 2004 under the leadership of then-Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, recognising Central Asia as a collective geopolitical entity. Over the years, the format has been adopted by other major powers, including Russia, the US, South Korea, China, India, and the EU, each using the C5+1 model to interact with the Central Asian states.

What sets the C5+1 format apart is its flexibility and informality. Unlike the EU, which operates with a high level of institutionalisation and collective representation, the C5+1 format allows Central Asian states to engage in bilateral relations with a multilateral backdrop, without the need for a permanent institutional structure. This lack of formalisation provides the agility needed for the region, especially under the pressures of geopolitical tensions. The C5+1 format has proven to be effective and periodic, allowing Central Asian countries to stand together and increase their visibility on the global stage while maintaining their individual sovereignty.

The diverse array of C5+1 formats highlights the adaptability and strategic foresight of Central Asian states in navigating the complexities of regional and global geopolitics. This adaptability is particularly evident when comparing different C5+1 engagements. For instance, the C5+1 format with the US, formalised through the inaugural Presidential Summit during the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 2023, underscores a focus on resilience through partnership.21 This partnership encompasses expanded security cooperation, economic and energy corridor development, and people-to-people ties, reflecting the US's broader strategic interests in fostering stability and connectivity in the region.

In contrast, the C5+1 format with China, exemplified by the May 2023 summit in Xian, presents a different set of priorities. During this summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced a Grand Development Plan designed to secure alternative transportation routes for critical goods, such as raw materials and food products.22 This plan aligns with the broader objectives of China's BRI, which emphasises infrastructure development, economic collaboration, and energy partnerships. Additionally, China's commitment to regional security and assistance in combating terrorism was highlighted, demonstrating Beijing's intent to strengthen its influence in Central Asia while ensuring its security interests are safeguarded.

The juxtaposition of these summits reveals both alignment and divergence in the interests of major powers engaged with Central Asia. While certain areas of cooperation, such as security and connectivity, may overlap, the underlying strategic objectives often differ, reflecting each power's unique vision for its role in the region. The proliferation of C5+1 summits in 2023 further illustrates the growing importance of this diplomatic platform, as it allows Central Asian states to engage with multiple major powers on a more frequent and flexible basis.

For example, the June 2023 C5+EU meeting in Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, focused on business cooperation, technology transfer, investments, and digital connectivity, areas where the EU seeks to assert its influence. Similarly, the C5+Gulf Cooperation Council summit in Saudi Arabia in July 2023 demonstrated Central Asia's efforts to diversify its international partnerships, particularly in response to the evolving geopolitical landscape.

The flexibility inherent in the non-institutionalised nature of the C5+1 formats is a critical factor in their success. It allows Central Asian states to tailor their engagements with major powers based on specific needs and priorities without being constrained by formal treaties or rigid institutional frameworks. This approach enables them to take the initiative in deciding which projects to pursue and to what extent, ensuring that their interests are safeguarded while maintaining productive relationships with each partner.

Central Asian states have made a concerted effort to be valuable partners for each major power, demonstrating tangible improvements from one forum to the next. This strategy ensures that the C5+1 formats remain efficient and effective, providing a dynamic platform for addressing regional challenges and opportunities.

The combination of flexibility and directed commitment within the C5+1 formats has enabled Central Asian states to adeptly manoeuvre the complexities of the geopolitical landscape. By engaging with major powers on their own terms, Central Asian nations have managed to maintain a degree of autonomy and freedom as they pursue a multi-alignment approach in a world increasingly defined by great power competition.

Envisioning an Open Central Asia

The Middle Corridor, while being one of several trade routes connecting Asia to Europe, represents an important political opportunity for the region, despite its long-standing economic challenges. The infrastructure of the Middle Corridor has existed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but its economic viability faces stiff competition with the Northern Route (Figure 1).

Although the Middle Corridor is shorter in distance, the Northern Route is logistically simpler. The latter traverses through regions with low population density, reduced traffic, and fewer borders, with Russia serving as the central transit hub. The nation's capacity to self-finance the maintenance and expansion of its infrastructure, coupled with the route being primarily rail-based, gives it a competitive advantage. In contrast, the Middle Corridor faces significant logistical challenges, being multimodal and requiring substantial external investment to overcome infrastructure bottlenecks. The competition between these routes is inherently imbalanced.

However, transportation routes are not solely defined by economic factors; they are deeply intertwined with political dynamics. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has thrust the Middle Corridor into the geopolitical spotlight, providing Central Asia with an unprecedented opportunity to assert its openness. While the Middle Corridor's primary function is to serve as a land bridge between China and Europe, it plays a more critical role for the countries along its path. It offers a means of trade route diversification and enhanced connectivity for Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. These countries, particularly Kazakhstan, have been heavily reliant on Russia as a key trading partner and a gateway to global trade networks. Before 2022, for example, 39 percent of Kazakhstan's imports originated from Russia.23 For Central Asia, a landlocked region, the Middle Corridor offers essential diversification of export and import routes, providing an alternative that does not pass through a great power and is therefore less vulnerable to being abruptly cut off.

From the perspective of regional powers, the future development of the Middle Corridor presents distinct priorities compared to the interests of end recipients like the EU and China. While all parties share a common interest in improving speed and reducing costs, the countries of Central Asia must balance short-term sacrifices in these areas against the long-term benefits of sustained and consistent development. The Middle Corridor is a critical strategic asset, but it is not a long-term replacement for the Northern Route as the principal East-West corridor. The Northern Route's inherent advantages are likely to prevail in the long run, making the Middle Corridor's endgame the creation of a competitive alternative for those unwilling to engage with Russia.

The current geopolitical climate has provided the Middle Corridor with a significant head start, but this advantage is unlikely to last indefinitely. It is incumbent upon the countries of the region to capitalise on this momentum in a manner that ensures the sustainability of the Corridor, even as global attention eventually wanes. The achieved outcomes must be convincing enough to attract continued investment and utilisation.

For the Central Asian region, the intrinsic value of the Middle Corridor lies not in the revenue generated from managing the transit of goods between China and Europe, but rather in its role as a crucial exit strategy, providing access to global markets while bypassing neighboring great powers. The prospect that interest in the Middle Corridor may diminish over time does not imply a decrease in transit volume; on the contrary, as infrastructure develops and trade between China and Europe increases, the volume of goods moving along the Corridor is expected to rise. However, this growth in transit values is unlikely to be sufficient to rival the dominant Maritime Route or the Northern Route to Europe. As these alternatives remain viable, a point may be reached where further investments in the Middle Corridor's capacity, speed, and cost-effectiveness do not justify the associated financial burden, especially for the end beneficiaries.

This does not suggest that investment in the Middle Corridor will cease entirely, but it is likely to diminish significantly, with a larger share of the responsibility for building and maintaining infrastructure falling on the countries along the route. This projection aligns with the World Bank's forecast, which anticipates that by 2030, the trade volume along the Middle Corridor will triple, yet it will continue to function primarily as a regional route.[xii]

With this outlook in mind, two key areas of improvement are critical for all countries along the route, particularly Central Asia, to maintain the region's ‘openness’: operational efficiency and connectivity.

Operational efficiency refers primarily to streamlining processes by monitoring operations, gathering feedback, identifying bottlenecks, and addressing them. This can be achieved through direct operational changes or infrastructure upgrades to more efficient systems, as well as enhanced cross-border cooperation aimed at reducing delays caused by human factors. Improvements in trade facilitation, border management, and service delivery are essential. Currently, customs and border management systems are inadequately digitalised, limiting effective information exchange and coordination. There is also a lack of coordinated, scheduled, and time-definite services along the Corridor, which hampers efficiency.

One area where partnerships with other major actors could play a pivotal role is in improving operational efficiency. For example, Japan's JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), in collaboration with the World Customs Organization (WCO), has launched a joint project to create a unified re-education program for customs officers along the Corridor.24 This initiative could significantly enhance customs procedures and reduce delays. Additionally, the issue of multiple operators and interfaces, which complicates the logistics process, is exacerbated by the absence of a single operator responsible for transport from origin to destination. This results in time losses at interfaces and during transshipments.

Addressing this issue, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have moved to create a joint operator, the ‘Middle Corridor Multimodal Ltd.’, which was officially established in October 2023.25 This initiative, if properly implemented, has the potential to mitigate these inefficiencies, reduce transit times, and pave the way for further unification of procedures, thereby increasing operational efficiency along the Corridor. By focusing on these areas, Central Asian countries can better position themselves to sustain the benefits of the Middle Corridor and keep the region open to global markets.

Connectivity in the context of the Middle Corridor typically refers to the expansion and further integration of transport systems within the region, aiming to diminish trade obstacles posed by geographic constraints. In the long term, this concept extends beyond merely removing existing obstacles and bottlenecks; it also encompasses the enhancement of infrastructure quality and the diversification of transportation networks. This horizontal expansion of transport systems ensures that the region's connectivity is robust and versatile, capable of handling a broader range of logistical demands.

In practical terms, this approach means that instead of relying on a single terminal or port to manage the entire volume of goods, it is more strategic to diversify routes and facilities. This diversification not only enhances the system's capacity but also reduces vulnerabilities to disruptions at any single point. For instance, addressing delays at the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border could be approached through two complementary strategies: increasing operational efficiency by tackling bureaucratic inefficiencies and enhancing connectivity by constructing new railway sections.[xiii] Such a dual approach not only resolves immediate issues but also future-proofs the corridor's development, making it more resilient and adaptable to changing demands.

The ultimate goal of maintaining and enhancing regional connectivity is to transform the Middle Corridor from a mere transit route into a fully-fledged economic corridor. Achieving this requires significant investment and coordinated efforts from global partners such as the EU, the US, and Japan. The benefits of transforming the Middle Corridor into an economic corridor are substantial. While the route will continue to serve transcontinental shipments, forecasts suggest that after 2030, less than 40 percent of its use will be for such purposes, with the remaining 60 percent driven by regional trade.

This shift in the corridor's function would address several strategic concerns simultaneously. Firstly, should China opt to prioritise the northern or maritime routes, European investments in the Middle Corridor's infrastructure would predominantly benefit Europe and the regional countries themselves, thereby limiting China's influence in Central Asia. Secondly, the Central Asian region, particularly Kazakhstan, possesses considerable potential to emerge as a viable alternative to China or Russia as a supplier of critical minerals. These minerals are essential for high-tech industries and clean energy supply chains, making Central Asia a strategically important region for global supply chains.

Moreover, the development of the Middle Corridor as an economic corridor could facilitate the supply of energy materials from Central Asia to the EU, bypassing Russia. This would not only enhance Europe's energy security but also solidify Central Asia's role as a key player in the global energy market. The creation of a diversified, well-integrated transport network within the region would therefore serve not just as an economic boon but as a geopolitical strategy to ensure long-term regional stability and independence from neighboring great powers.

The final, often underappreciated, aspect of enhancing connectivity through the Middle Corridor is the potential for increased security in the region. When countries align their efforts toward a common goal, tensions tend to decrease, fostering deeper partnerships and reducing the likelihood of conflicts. The Middle Corridor, which connects not only Central Asia but also the Caucasus and the Black Sea, has the potential to bring these regions closer together, thereby promoting stability.

This effect is already evident in the ongoing peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where Kazakhstan has played a mediating role. One of the key issues on the agenda is the increased connectivity through the Zangezur Corridor, which exemplifies how infrastructure projects can serve as catalysts for regional cooperation and conflict resolution.[xiv] By linking these regions through shared infrastructure and economic interests, the Middle Corridor can help mitigate historical tensions and build stronger, more cooperative relationships among its participating countries.

While the Middle Corridor has succeeded in making Central Asia more ‘open’, the challenge now is for the region to sustain and build upon this momentum. As the geopolitical landscape continues to evolve, it is crucial that Central Asia not only preserves the gains made but also expands them. There is still time to achieve these goals, but it requires a clear and sustained strategic focus. The possibility of transforming the Middle Corridor into a full-fledged economic corridor must remain a central objective. By doing so, Central Asia can unlock new opportunities and attract potential partners to the long-term benefits of this transformation.

The success of the Middle Corridor hinges on the region’s ability to maintain strategic direction and capitalise on the current geopolitical window. The work ahead is considerable, but the potential rewards—greater connectivity, security, and economic integration—are well worth the effort.

Navigating the Challenges

While the geopolitical shifts following the war in Ukraine have favoured Central Asia, making the region both freer and more open, these gains are not guaranteed to last. The momentum could easily swing in the opposite direction, posing significant challenges not only to advancing these gains but also to preserving what has already been achieved.

As military activity in Ukraine subsides and potential peace talks loom on the horizon—especially influenced by the US presidential race—Russia's attention is likely to return to Central Asia. The post-conflict period will bring a recalibration of Russian foreign policy, with increased focus on reasserting influence over its perceived sphere of influence, including Central Asia. Although the Russia-led CSTO has never fully functioned as an effective security organisation, Russia’s diminished role as a security guarantor in the region makes any revival of the CSTO unlikely. The same concerns apply to the EAEU. Despite Russian efforts to push for the expansion of the EAEU, including attempts to persuade Tajikistan to join, the format offers too few incentives for Central Asian countries to gain significant traction or benefits from participation. Consequently, any resurgence of Russian influence will probably be felt more acutely in bilateral relations and through increased involvement in the internal affairs of the Central Asian states.

Another area of concern is the SCO. The prospect of China and Russia converging on a common agenda within the forum presents a challenge. There is a possibility that the SCO could be transformed into a BRICS 2.0, positioning itself as an alternative bloc to the Western-led global order. However, this shared vision between China and Russia is based on differing motivations: China sees it as a vehicle for expanding its influence and interests, while Russia views it as a means to disrupt Western dominance. This vision contrasts sharply with that of other SCO member states, which view the organisation as a platform for addressing specific regional issues rather than as an alternative to the existing global order.

The divergence in these visions was evident in the Astana Declaration of July 2024, which concluded Kazakhstan’s presidency of the SCO. The declaration, highlighted by the presence of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emphasised a more balanced approach focused on regional issues rather than global power competition. However, the future trajectory of the SCO—and by extension, the region’s alignment—will largely depend on how the situation in Ukraine evolves and how swiftly Russia reorients its focus towards Central Asia.

China’s assumption of the SCO presidency for 2024-2025 will be critical in shaping the organisation’s direction for the next five years. The presidency could either continue the trend established during Kazakhstan's tenure, favouring the inclusion of a wider range of participants with diverse agendas, or it could shift toward a more ‘great power-oriented’ stance, positioning the SCO as a challenger to the West. If the latter scenario unfolds, it could undo much of the progress made by Kazakhstan in fostering a middle-power approach, solidifying the SCO’s agenda around great power competition rather than regional cooperation.

The development of the Middle Corridor, a key factor in making Central Asia more ‘open’, is not without its challenges. While the progress made in the last two years is impressive, several significant issues persist. Despite the rapid growth in trade volume along the Middle Corridor, it remains a fraction of the volume transported through the Northern Corridor, even after the substantial decline in trade via the Northern route in 2022. By 2023, trade volumes along the Northern Corridor began to recover, a trend that is likely to continue. A significant portion of this recovery is due to the sanctions-related surge in trade between China and Russia. However, westbound trade volumes through the Northern Corridor are also increasing, suggesting a potential return to pre-2022 levels.

Several factors contribute to the Middle Corridor's ongoing challenges. It has longer lead times, higher costs due to its multi-modal nature, and lacks unified customs services. Additionally, multiple bottlenecks along the route further complicate its efficiency. For Central Asian countries, the effectiveness of the Middle Corridor is limited by the availability of financing, technology, and specialised personnel. These challenges are compounded by global issues, such as climate change, which affects the modernisation of key infrastructure like the Aktau port terminal in Kazakhstan. The shrinking of the Caspian Sea, for example, necessitates coordinated efforts not only at the port but along the entire trade route to mitigate its impact.

Furthermore, many of the solutions to potential bottlenecks lie outside Central Asia. The capacity of ports in Azerbaijan and Georgia, the availability of rail rolling stock in transit countries, and the resolution of long-standing conflicts, such as the potential opening of the Zangazur corridor with Armenia and Azerbaijan, are all critical to the Middle Corridor's success. The future of this corridor, which is essential for keeping the region open, depends on the long-term commitments of major players at both ends of the route.

China, while not likely to fully withdraw its support for the Middle Corridor, will maintain its involvement as a contingency should relations with Russia sour again. However, the more crucial question is whether the EU will continue to invest heavily in the Middle Corridor or eventually revert to the cheaper and more established Northern route. Although the current state of relations between Russia and the West may seem irreparable, history since 2014 has shown that economic considerations often outweigh geopolitical tensions. Therefore, a scenario in which the EU returns to the Northern Corridor remains possible.

The timing of post-Ukraine normalisation will be critical, particularly concerning the potential lifting of sanctions on Russia and the extent of such measures. In five years, the Middle Corridor may not be seen as an alternative to the Northern route but rather compared to it based on economic and logistical feasibility. To keep the region as open as possible, Central Asian countries must coordinate efforts not only to attract investment along the route but also to ensure that these initiatives are worthwhile in terms of return on investment (ROI). This means that beyond mere participation, these countries must demonstrate the Corridor's long-term viability and profitability to retain the interest of key stakeholders, ensuring that the region remains a vital and open gateway between East and West.

To fully realise the potential of a free and open Central Asia, it is crucial to engage additional partners beyond China and the EU. These partners can help address critical bottlenecks in infrastructure, technology, and human resources, which are essential for enhancing the region's connectivity and economic prospects. One illustrative example is Kazakhstan's partnership with Singapore's PSA International—a leading global port group—to develop the infrastructure of the Caspian Aktau port. This cooperation, initiated in 2023, was further expanded in May 2024 during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's official visit to Singapore. The collaboration with PSA International is a strategic move that brings advanced port management expertise and a global perspective to Kazakhstan’s efforts to strengthen its transit potential.

Another key partner in this initiative is Japan, particularly through its leadership in the C5+1 format. The nation's involvement is not limited to infrastructure development but also extends to the crucial area of human resource development. For instance, the C5+1 dialogue held in March 2023, titled ‘Connectivity with Central Asia and the Caucasus,’ emphasised the importance of enhancing transport and communication networks across the region. A significant outcome of these discussions was the launch of a joint project between the WCO and the JICA, aimed at improving the education and training of customs officers in Central Asia. Such initiatives are vital for streamlining trade processes and reducing the inefficiencies that currently hinder the Middle Corridor's competitiveness.

Further, Japan’s engagement in the region is exemplified by the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Uzbekistan's Ministry of Transport. This agreement, along with growing cooperation from companies like Sojitz Corporation in high-tech sectors, highlights Japan's commitment to supporting Central Asia's modernisation efforts.

The role of the US in promoting a free and open Central Asia has been ambiguous, despite its significant economic presence and FDI in the region. This ambiguity stems from several factors, including the legacy of US involvement in Afghanistan and an inconsistent strategy toward Central Asia that often frames the region within the context of the great power competition between China and Russia, dubbing it the ‘New Great Game’.

America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan left a profound impact on the region. The abrupt and poorly managed exit, followed by the Taliban's takeover, not only created instability in the nation but also shut down the potential for the route, which could have provided Central Asia with access to East Asia. This situation has forced Central Asian states to refocus on the threats of religious extremism and terrorism, concerns that have dominated their security agendas for the past two decades. In response, Kazakhstan has taken steps to address regional stability by promoting the establishment of a United Nations (UN) Regional Center for Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan, with its headquarters in Almaty.

Another challenge is the lack of a consistent and coherent US strategy toward Central Asia. Its New Great Game’ approach overlooks the region's unique dynamics and the importance of the US fostering deeper, more constructive relationships with Central Asian states. A striking example of this inconsistency is the persistence of the Jackson-Vanik amendments, which continue to apply to all Central Asian countries except Kyrgyzstan. These amendments prevent the establishment of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with the US, thereby hindering deeper economic ties.

The US position on the Middle Corridor also reflects this ambiguity. While the corridor bypasses Russia and supports European allies, it also benefits China, which the US views as its main global adversary. However, this shortsighted perspective fails to recognise the broader implications of the Middle Corridor. By keeping the region ‘open’, the Middle Corridor allows Central Asian states to maintain their freedom and autonomy, contributing to a free and open Caucasus and Black Sea region as well. US investments and technological support in Central Asia would not only help prevent China from expanding its influence through initiatives like the Digital Silk Road but also reinforce the region's independence and stability.

For the US, advocating for a free and open Central Asia extends beyond mere strategic competition with global rivals; it reflects a commitment to bolstering the region's autonomy, economic development, and integration into the global economy. This stance aligns with broader American interests in fostering stability and prosperity in a region that holds significant geopolitical importance, situated at the intersection of Europe and Asia.

The potential transformation of the Middle Corridor into a thriving economic artery is particularly crucial for US national interests. By supporting the development of this corridor, the US can help diversify global supply chains, tapping into Central Asia's valuable reserves of rare earth elements (REEs) and its burgeoning capacities in both traditional and renewable energy sectors. This would not only enhance global resource security but also mitigate the influence of Russia and China in the region.

However, the success of such an initiative will hinge on the proactive engagement of Central Asian states. It is incumbent upon the region to recognise the strategic value of a deeper partnership with the US and to advocate for collaboration that capitalises on the opportunities presented by the Middle Corridor. These partnerships are crucial not only for providing alternatives to the dominant players like China and the EU but also for addressing the pressing issues that hinder the region's full integration into global markets. However, these partnerships come with their own set of challenges. Unlike China or the EU, which have direct and substantial benefits from increased connectivity in Central Asia, partners like the US, Japan, and Singapore are investing in the region with less immediate gain. This means that there is even greater pressure on Central Asian countries to ensure that these investments are worthwhile. The countries of the region must therefore actively promote the idea that a free and open Central Asia offers significant benefits to all participants, even on a global scale. This involves identifying specific bottlenecks and challenges, attracting targeted investments to address them, and, most importantly, ensuring that these investments lead to tangible improvements that encourage further investment.

To achieve this, proactive diplomacy will be essential. Central Asian states must seek out and construct fruitful international partnerships. By demonstrating the tangible benefits of investing in the region—whether through improved trade routes, better infrastructure, or a more skilled workforce—they can create a positive feedback loop that attracts more investment and further strengthens the region's position on the global stage. Ultimately, while many of the solutions to the region's challenges lie outside its immediate borders, Central Asia's leaders can bridge this divide through strategic partnerships and a clear, compelling free and open vision for the future.

[i] James J. Carafano and Kaush Arha, “Bridging Free and Open Spaces Serves U.S. Interests,” The National Interest, March 30, 2023, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/bridging-free-and-open-spaces-serves-us-interests-206361  

[ii] Colin Knox and Dina Sharipova, “Authoritarianism and civil society in Central Asia: Shifting boundaries,” Journal of Civil Society, (20/2: 2024): 109-129.  

[iii] Hubert Zimmerman, “Russia, China and the revisionist assault on the western liberal order,” International Affairs, (100/Issue 3: May 2024): 1304–1306, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae103.

[iv] Евразийская Экономическая Комиссия, “EAEU and SCO develop interaction,” May, 30, 2024, https://eec.eaeunion.org/en/news/eaes-i-shos-razvivayut-vzaimodeystvie/.

[v] James Jay Carafano and Silviu Nate, “The West Should Welcome the Middle Corridor,” The National Interest, October, 1, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/west-should-welcome-middle-corridor-205085.

[vi] Reid Standish, “How Two Years Of War In Ukraine Have Changed Central Asia,” RadioFreeEurope, February, 23, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-war-central-asia-impact-russia-china/32832774.html.  

[vii] Shujaat Ahmadzada, “Ukraine War Fuels Resurgence of Modern “Silk Road”, Carnegie Politika, June, 10, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/06/silk-road-war-ukraine?lang=en.

[viii] Genevieve Donnellon-May, “Kazakhstan’s Emergence as a Middle Power: Implications for Western Relations,” Asia Society, February 29th, 2024, https://asiasociety.org/australia/kazakhstans-emergence-middle-power-implications-western-relations.  

[ix] Miras Zhiyenbayev, “From Backwater to Beacon: Kazakhstan’s Identity as a Middle Power,” Modern Diplomacy, July, 15, 2024, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/07/15/from-backwater-to-beacon-kazakhstans-identity-as-a-middle-power/; Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, “Middle powers have the power to save multilateralism,” Euronews, May, 28, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/2024/05/28/middle-powers-have-the-power-to-save-multilateralism.  

[x] Edward Lemon and Bradley Jardine, “Central Asia could help the West break its dependence on China’s critical minerals,” The Hill, January, 29, 2024, https://thehill.com/opinion/4434965-central-asia-could-help-the-west-break-its-dependence-on-chinas-critical-minerals/  

[xi] World Bank, “The Middle Trade and Transport Corridor: Policies and Investments to Triple Freight Volumes and Halve Travel Time by 2030”, November, 27, 2023, https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/publication/middle-trade-and-transport-corridor  

[xii] “The Middle Trade and Transport Corridor: Policies and Investments to Triple Freight Volumes and Halve Travel Time by 2030,” World Bank, November, 27, 2023, https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/publication/middle-trade-and-transport-corridor.  

[xiii] Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Landmark megaproject: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to be connected via new railroad,” November, 27, 2023, https://primeminister.kz/en/news/landmark-megaproject-kazakhstan-and-uzbekistan-to-be-connected-via-new-railroad-26408.  

[xiv] “What is the Zangezur Corridor and why does it matter to Eurasia?,” TRT World, https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/what-is-the-zangezur-corridor-and-why-does-it-matter-to-eurasia-58405.