RUSI Newsbrief – Kazakhstan in the Middle: Resilience in the Face of Great Power Rivalry

Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy has enabled it tonavigate great power rivalries, safeguarding its autonomywhile emerging as a key middle power on the global stage.

Kazakhstan's strategic position between Russia and China requires carefuldecision-making. Historically, its ‘multivector’ foreign policy has enabled thecountry to balance major powers’ competing interests, preserving autonomyand fostering cooperation with the West. By engaging multiple global actors,Kazakhstan has safeguarded its sovereignty and carved out a uniqueinternational role.

In my 2023 book Widening the Scope, I argued that Kazakhstan had long actedas a middle power, even before being officially recognised as such. Initially, this claim faced scepticism. Critics doubted Kazakhstan's ability to exert influence, citing its economic dependencies and proximity to Russia and China. However, the notion of ‘middlepowership’ has become a central theme in Kazakhstani policy, and by 2024, it had gained widespread recognition. International think tanks and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev have emphasised Kazakhstan’s growing role, shifting the debate from whether Kazakhstan is a middle power to exploring its implications.

The discourse on Kazakhstan's middle power status reveals two opposing views. Some scholars argue that middle powers, including Kazakhstan, have limited agency, seeing their multi-alignment as a strategy to navigate great power dominance with minimal real influence. Others suggest that Kazakhstan's international orientation is a distraction from its domestic challenges, diverting resources away from much-needed reforms. Both views share a common scepticism, implying that Kazakhstanʼs actions do not fundamentally alter the geopolitical order.

These critiques, however, overlook the evolving balance of power. Kazakhstanʼs cooperation with Russia and China is driven by geographic necessity, but the extent of this cooperation remains a strategic choice. Economic development and incremental reforms are essential for stability in this volatile region. Kazakhstanʼs balancing act between major powers is a long-term strategy, requiring meticulous planning and commitment. This cautious approach contrasts with more populist or short-term strategies that could undermine its social and economic foundations. Middle powers like Kazakhstan must avoid favouring one side too heavily, maintaining equilibrium in the face of great power rivalry.

Middle powers see the global order differently from great powers. While great powers prioritise dominance, middle powers focus on security and stability. Their limited economic resilience forces them to adopt cautious, pragmatic approaches, addressing issues incrementally. This perspective in􀁾uences the understanding of middle power status itself. For great powers, ʻmiddleʼ denotes a lesser power in a vertical hierarchy, while for middle powers, it reflects a spatial, horizontal position – ʻin-betweenʼ geographically, politically and economically.

The power-based worldview, while not without problems, remains an extremely effective tool for quantifying the global order from a great power perspective. A prime example of this is the Lowy Institute Asia Power Index, which presents a hierarchy of power relations in Asia using state-of-the-art methodology. This index offers valuable insights but also highlights deficiencies when applied specifically to middle powers. For instance, it categorises Russia as a middle power based on power rankings, yet Russia clearly does not fit into the middle power category in terms of its in􀁾uence, ambitions and policies. This discrepancy illustrates that while power ranking is useful, it is not comprehensive; position and in􀁾uence are not always quantifiable.

Furthermore, power ranking exposes another issue: the discrepancy between the upper and lower echelons of middle powers. The category becomes so vast that it loses analytical precision – it's either everyone is a middle power or no one is. This broad classification dilutes the term's significance and complicates meaningful analysis. What power ranking effectively shows is the dissolution of power that affects great powers themselves. These categories were conceived at a time when the gap between great powers and all others was immense; great powers held an overwhelming majority of power across various domains. This is no longer the case. Quantifiable measures now indicate that the gap between great and middle powers has significantly narrowed.

Kazakhstan strives to maintain a strategic distancefrom both China and Russia, while also ensuring that these two powers remain at a distance from each other

This shift means that middle powers as a category will hold increasinginfl uence and sway in world politics. Importantly, middle powers viewcooperation through diff erent lenses: they value each other not in terms ofsheer power but shared interests. They tend to collaborate with those whocan help address specifi c problems, paving the way for ‘minilateralism’ – short-lived alliances of convenience formed to tackle particular issues. This approach contrasts with traditional power dynamics, emphasising practical solutions over hierarchical status.

The prominence of these aspects in current international relations is due to recent critical junctures. One was the global Covid-19 pandemic, which exposed the dangers of relying on a single source for problem-solving. It demonstrated that having several functional relationships is preferable to depending on one deep partnership. Another is the Ukrainian war, which has shown what happens to middle powers caught in the crossfire of great power rivalry. Simultaneously, it has spurred a backlash against attempts to divide the world into two opposing groups based on their stance on the con􀁾ict. Significantly, such reactions do not equate to an endorsement of Russian actions, but rather highlight a commitment to the principles of equality and opposition to a bipolar system. This indicates that middle powers, while lacking a unifying agenda, are poised to provide a counterbalance – not against any particular great power, but against the trend toward bipolarity in general.

Kazakhstan in the Middle

Applying a horizontal framework to Kazakhstan's geopolitical situation is particularly insightful. While one prerequisite of being a middle power is the ability to exert some form of in􀁾uence, Kazakhstan's practical circumstances – as a landlocked country nestled between China and Russia – limit its opportunities for traditional power projection. Considering the overlapping interests of these two great powers in the region, Kazakhstan's emergence as a middle power from a purely power-based perspective seems unlikely. However, this improbability actually lends credibility to the concept of Kazakhstan as a middle power within a horizontal framework that emphasises strategic positioning and diplomacy over sheer power.

Exploring the question of what Kazakhstan represents as a middle power reveals its unique significance as a subject of study. It is the only country globally that borders two great powers simultaneously. This unique geopolitical reality means that Kazakhstan's policies have, from the outset, needed to focus on counterbalancing these in􀁾uences. Yet, there is more to the story than mere balancing. While certain aspects of its relationships with China and Russia are inevitable – you cannot be a landlocked country adjacent to great powers without conceding some political autonomy – the critical difference lies in how Kazakhstan manages this autonomy. It is not simply surrendered, but strategically exchanged to serve the countryʼs national interests.

The perils of a bipolar world are perhaps felt more intensely in Kazakhstan than elsewhere. The country's autonomy and prosperity are precariously balanced on the divergences between its powerful neighbours. The prospect of China and Russia finding common ground is, therefore, unsettling for Kazakhstan. Fortunately, the inherent nature of great powers, with their competing ambitions, makes such a convergence unlikely. Failed attempts to unify regional organisations, like the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, testify to the challenges these powers face in aligning their agendas. However, if external pressures were to force China and Russia to temporarily align their interests, this could spell disaster for Kazakhstan, which effectively serves as a buffer state that exists due to their differences.

This context underscores the vital importance of middle power policies for Kazakhstan. The country strives to maintain a strategic distance from both China and Russia, while also ensuring that these two powers remain at a distance from each other. This necessitates a continuous process of bargaining and reciprocal diplomacy. Kazakhstan seeks to secure favourable agreements with both neighbours, allowing it to implement incremental democratic and liberal reforms without provoking them. Simultaneously, it engages in interest-based cooperation with Western countries to prevent Russia and China from further encroaching on its sovereignty and to balance their regional in􀁾uence.

For decades, this approach was a slow and methodical process. Recentedevelopments, however, have opened new avenues for cooperation. The warein Ukraine has had profound impacts beyond the immediate geopolitical shi􀁿s,enotably by drawing attention to the Trans-Caspian International TransporteRoute, commonly known as the Middle Corridor. This route offers an alternative to the Northern Corridor, which predominantly passes througheRussia. The Middle Corridor's emergence provides Kazakhstan and othereCentral Asian countries with an export-import route free from direct greatepower interference, thereby unlocking new possibilities for internationale collaboration.

Engaging with Kazakhstan requires a nuanced understanding of its unique position and the challenges it faces as a middle power bordered by two great powers

Yet, this opportunity may be transient. While the Middle Corridor off erssignifi cant strategic advantages, economic considerations oft en overshadowstrategic principles. Analyses by institutions like the World Bank cast doubton the corridor's long-term viability as a transcontinental route due toeconomic and logistical challenges. The period following the normalisationof relations aft er the Ukraine confl ict will be critical, especially regarding thepotential lift ing of sanctions on Russia and the extent of such actions. In thenext fi ve years, the Middle Corridor may not be viewed as a direct alternativeto the Northern Corridor, but rather assessed alongside it based on economic feasibility.

To ensure the region remains as open and connected as possible, CentralAsian countries must coordinate their eff orts not only to attract investment along the route but also to guarantee that such investment is compelling in terms of the return it provides. Beyond mere participation, these countries need to demonstrate the Middle Corridor's long-term viability and profitability to maintain the interest of key stakeholders. This will help secure the region's status as a vital and open gateway between East and West.

Ultimately, the Middle Corridor does not need to become a permanent transcontinental alternative to serve its purpose effectively. Its true value lies in opening up this landlocked region and enhancing connectivity. The critical question is whether there is enough to be gained from transforming the Middle Corridor from a mere transport route into a robust economic corridor – to which the answer is a􀂁rmative. Central Asia – and Kazakhstan, in particular – can have a significant impact on the stability and prosperity of Western countries.

Kazakhstan's substantial reserves of critical minerals, especially uranium and rare earth elements, place it at the forefront of global supply chains essential for the energy and technology sectors. As the world's largest producer of uranium, contributing 43% of global production in 2022, Kazakhstan plays a pivotal role in the nuclear energy sector. This supports global efforts to transition to low-carbon power sources, positioning the country as a strategic supplier for countries prioritising energy security and seeking to reduce reliance on less stable or monopolised sources.

Moreover, Central Asia, with Kazakhstan at its core, holds substantial shares of other critical mineral reserves, including 38.6% of the world's manganese ore, 30% of its chromium, 20% of its lead and 12.6% of its zinc. In the context of diversifying supply chains away from dominant suppliers like China, Kazakhstan's mineral wealth becomes increasingly significant. Legislative moves, such as the US House of Representatives' bill to ban Russian uranium imports, amplify the strategic importance of Kazakhstan's resources, especially as nuclear energy receives renewed global interest amid decarbonisation efforts. This combination of rich resources and favourable geopolitical positioning enhances Kazakhstan's role in meeting international demands, reducing dependency on major suppliers, and bolstering global energy security.

As the pivotal player in Central Asia, Kazakhstan represents a unique and valuable partner for the West. Unlike some other emerging middle powers, Kazakhstan does not position itself in opposition to the current liberal international order. Instead, it consistently acts as a normative middle power, advocating for diplomatic solutions, adherence to international norms, and multilateral cooperation. This alignment offers the West an opportunity to engage with Kazakhstan in a manner that supports mutual interests, including energy security, regional stability, and the promotion of shared values.

However, time is of the essence. The West's ability to formulate a consistent and reciprocal policy toward the region will be decisive in shaping geopolitical positions by the end of the decade. Engaging with Kazakhstan requires a nuanced understanding of its unique position and the challenges it faces as a middle power bordered by two great powers. By supporting Kazakhstan's efforts to maintain autonomy and balance in its foreign policy, the West can contribute to a more stable and multipolar international order.